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Abstract
This paper investigates theoretically how nancial development af-
fects the magnitude of nancial amplication. Financial development
yields two competing e¤ects, balance sheet e¤ects and shock cushion-
ing e¤ects. Depending on which of these forces dominates, we nd
that nancial amplication initially increases with nancial develop-
ment and later falls down. Moreover, we examine the role of monetary
policy to reduce nancial amplication. We nd that in the case of
unexpected productivity shocks, money growth targeting dampens -
nancial amplication by producing shock cushioning e¤ects. On the
other hand, ination targeting exacerbates the shocks because under
the policy, shock cushioning e¤ects are not generated.
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1 Introduction
What are the e¤ects of the development of nancial markets on ampli-
cation over the business cycle? Traditional wisdom suggests that nancial
development stabilizes the economy by providing various channels for risk di-
versication. According to this view, nancial innovation not only promotes
long-run economic growth by enhancing e¢ ciency in resource allocation, but
also it helps to cushion consumers and producers from the e¤ects of economic
shocks.1 This classical view seems to have been widely accepted. Indeed, sev-
eral empirical and quantitative studies support the positive role of nancial
development in reducing volatility (See Cecchetti et al, 2006; Dynan et al,
2006; Jerman and Quadrini, 2008).
However, the situation has begun to change dramatically since the out-
break of the credit crisis of 2007-08. A new perspective has emerged: nancial
development destabilizes the economy by accelerating nancial amplication.
Before the crisis, it was often pointed out that thanks to nancial innova-
tion, the leverage of borrowers increased, and this high leverage generated
economic booms. However, once the credit crisis occurred, people began to
state that such a high leverage could lead to signicant damages in borrowers
balance sheets, and eventually in the nancial system as a whole. Financial
development is suddenly blamed for increasing volatility. Indeed, IMF (2006,
2008) supports this new view by presenting empirical evidences that in more-
advanced nancial systems, the shock propagation e¤ects become stronger.2
Motivated by these conicting views, this paper theoretically investigates
the following questions: What is the relationship between nancial develop-
ment and nancial amplication (macroeconomic volatility)? Does nancial
development accelerate or decelerate nancial amplication? In order to an-
swer these questions, we develop a model of nancial development with en-
dogenous growth. The two key elements of this framework are the borrowing
constraint and the heterogeneous investment projects high prot invest-
ment projects with agency problems and low prot investment projects with
less agency problems. The former captures balance sheet e¤ects that magnify
1Levine(1997), Beck et al. (2000) show empirically that nancial development causes
long run economic growth.
2IMF reports argue that the sensitivity of real GDP growth rate, corporate investment,
household consumption, and residential investment response to equity busts, or business
cycles, is increasing in more market-based nancial systems.
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shocks.3 The latter plays an important role in describing shock cushioning
e¤ects. By changing the degree of the borrowing constraint, which is de-
ned as nancial development, this paper shows that nancial development
not only strengthens balance sheet e¤ects through changing leverage, but
also it produces shock cushioning e¤ects through an adjustment of the real
interest rate. The balance between these two competing forces determines
whether nancial development magnies or dampens nancial amplication.
Moreover, the balance by itself changes according to the degree of nancial
development.
Our main result shows that in a low development region, while shock cush-
ioning e¤ects do not work well, balance sheet e¤ects get strengthened with
nancial development, thereby accelerating nancial amplication. However,
once the level of development passes a certain degree, shock cushioning e¤ects
start working, which in turn weakens balance sheet e¤ects, thereby dampen-
ing nancial amplication. Hence, the relation between nancial develop-
ment and nancial amplication is non-monotonic: nancial amplication
initially increases with nancial development and later falls down.
Moreover, we examine government policy to reduce nancial amplica-
tion. Under the low development level, once negative productivity shocks
hit an economy, downward amplication occurs, which impairs agentswel-
fare such as workers. Thus, there is a potential role for macro policies. In
this paper, we analyze the role of monetary policy. We nd that in the case
of unexpected productivity shocks, money growth targeting policy dampens
nancial amplication by producing shock cushioning e¤ects, thereby stabi-
lizing economies. On the other hand, ination targeting policy exacerbates
the shocks because under the policy, shock cushioning e¤ects are not gener-
ated, thereby destabilizing economies.
This paper is in line with business cycle theory which emphasizes the role
of credit market imperfections. Following the seminal work by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), some researchers put nancial
factors a central role in accounting for business uctuations (See Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1997; Kiyotaki, 1998; Bernanke et al., 1999; Kocherlakota, 2000;
Cordoba and Ripoll, 2004). These studies demonstrate how shocks are am-
plied through balance sheet e¤ects, assuming a xed degree of the borrowing
constraint.4 Our study relaxes this assumption. By so doing, we show that
3See Bernanke et al. (1996) for balance sheet e¤ects.
4A recent study by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) shows that amplication in-
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there exists not only a region in which balance sheet e¤ects dominate shock
cushioning e¤ects, but also a region in which shock cushioning e¤ects negate
balance sheet e¤ects.
In the point that this paper examines the relation between nancial devel-
opment and nancial amplication, our paper is related to Rajan (2006) and
Shin (2009). Rajan argues that nancial development has made the world
better o¤, however it can accentuate real uctuations, and economies may be
more exposed to nancial-sector-induced turmoil than in the past. However,
Rajan does not necessarily propose a formal model of how nancial develop-
ment accelerates nancial amplication. Shin presents a theoretical model
where securitization by itself may not enhance nancial stability. Our study
shows the mechanisms within one framework that nancial development not
only accelerates nancial amplication, but also decelerates it.
Concerning this non-monotonic relation between nancial development
and nancial amplication (macroeconomic volatility), Aghion et al. (1999)
and Matsuyama (2007, 2008) are close to ours. Aghion et al. derive non-
monotonicity be developing an endogenous growth model with borrowing
constraints and heterogeneous investment projects. They show that volatil-
ity is low when the development level is low or high. High volatility (cycles
in their paper) occurs when the level has an intermediated value. Our paper
also shows that volatility is high when nancial development is in an interme-
diated development region. However, the source of high volatility is di¤erent
from their paper. In their model, a change in the interest rate has a role in
increasing volatility while in our model, it has a role in reducing volatility.5
In our model, high volatility is caused by balance sheet e¤ects togehter with
high leverage.
Matsuyama (2007, 2008) develops a model of the borrowing constraint
with various types of heterogeneities in an overlapping generations frame-
work, and shows how it leads to a wide range of non-monotonic phenomena.
In Matsuyamas model, the source of non-monotonicity lies in the invest-
ment projects which do not produce capital goods. He shows that a better
credit market might be more prone to nancing those investment projects,
creases by the interaction between funding liquidity and market liquidity, which refer to
the borrowing constraint and resaleability constraint, respectively.
5In Aghion et al.s model, a rise (decline) in the interest rate during booms (recessions)
increases (reduces) debts repayment, which in turn produces recessions (booms). In this
way, endogenous cycles with high volatility occur.
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and such a change in credit allocation generates non-monotonicity. On the
other hand, in our paper, the source of non-monotonicity lies in the change
in the interest rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. We analyze the dynamics and derive the relation between nancial
development and nancial amplication. In section 3, we examine the role
of monetary policy to reduce nancial amplication, and discuss its welfare
implications. Section 4 presents conclusion.
2 The Model
Consider a discrete-time economy with two types of goods, consumption
goods and capital goods and two types of agents, entrepreneurs and workers.
Let us start with the entrepreneurs, who are the central actors in the paper.
At date t, a typical entrepreneur has expected discounted utility:
E0
" 1X
t=0
t log ct
#
; (1)
where ct is the consumption at date t, and  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount
factor, and E0 [x] is the expected value of x conditional on information at
date 0.
Each entrepreneur can access investment projects to produce capital.
Every entrepreneur can access low prot investment projects, but only some
of the entrepreneurs, called H-entrepreneurs can access high prot invest-
ment prejects. The rest of the entrepreneurs we call L-entrepreneurs. The
investment technology follows
kt+1 = 
izt; (2)
where zt is investment of goods at date t.  is the marginal productivity
of investment, and i 2 fH;Lg is the index for the marginal productivity of
high and low prot investment, respectively. kt+1 is capital produced at date
t+ 1. We assume H > L.
Each type of investment projects is associated with agency problems (Hart
and Moore (1994), Tirole (2006)). The entrepreneurs who undertake high
(low) protable investment projects can pledge only a fraction H (L) of
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future returns from the investment. This fraction H or L can be collateral
in borrowing. We assume that H is less than L. That is, the degree of
agency frictions is less severe in low prot investment.
In addition, each entrepreneur knows his/her own type at date t of whether
or not he/she has high prot investment projects, but only knows it with
probability after date t + 1. That is, each entrepreneur shifts stochastically
between two states according to a Markov process: the state with high prot
investment or the state without it. Specically, an entrepreneur who has
high (low) protable investment at date t may have high prot investment
at date t + 1 with probability p (X(1   p)). This probability is exogenous,
and independent across entrepreneurs and over time. Assuming that the ini-
tial ratio of the entrepreneurs who have high and only low prot investment
is X : 1, the population ratio is constant over time. We assume that the
probability is not too large:
Assumption : p > X(1  p): (3)
This assumption implies that there is a positive correlation between the
present period and the next period. That is, the entrepreneur who has high
prot investment in the current period continues to have it next period with
higher probability than the one who has only low prot investment in the
current period.
The entrepreneurs ow of funds constraint is given by
ct + zt = qtkt   rt 1bt 1 + bt; (4)
where rt 1 and bt are the gross real interest rate, and the amount of bor-
rowing at date t  1 and t; respectively. qt is the relative price of capital to
consumption goods. The left hand side of (4) is expenditure: consumption
and investment. The right hand side is nancing: the returns from invest-
ment in the previous period minus debts repayment, which we call net worth
in this paper, and the amount of borrowing.
Because of the agency problems concerning the investment projects, the
entrepreneur faces the borrowing constraint.6 In such a situation, in order
for debt contracts to be credible, debts repayment does not exceed the value
of collateral. That is, the borrowing constraint becomes
6As Matsuyama (2007, 2008) points out, there are several causes to justify the borrow-
ing constraints from microeconomic literature (see Tirole 2006). Here, we do not get into
the details about which ones are more appropriate.
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rtbt  iqt+1izt: (5)
Here, without loss of generality, we assume that L is equal to one, which
implies that there is no agency friction on low prot investment. We also
dene H to be . The parameter  partly reects the legal structure and the
transaction costs in the liquidation of investment. In this sense,  provides a
simple measure of nancial development. In this paper, we dene an increase
in  as a nancial development.
Each entrepreneur chooses consumption, investment, capital, and borrow-
ing fct; zt; kt+1; btg to maximize the expected discounted utility (1) subject
to (2), (4), and (5).
Now, lets turn to the workers. There is only one type of workers. Each
worker is endowed with one unit of labor each period, and supplies it in-
elastically in the labor market. Workers do not have investment project to
produce capital, and therefore, do not have any collateral asset in order to
borrow. At date t, a typical worker has expected discounted utility:
E0
" 1X
t=0
0t log c0t
#
; (6)
where c0t is consumption of the workers at date t, and 
0 is the subjective
discount factor of the workers. We assume 0 < : This assumption implies
that the workers are impatient relative to the entrepreneurs, and ensures that
in equilibrium workers will not choose to lend.
Each worker chooses consumption, and the amount of borrowing to maxi-
mize (6) subject to the ow of funds constraint and the borrowing constraint.
c0t = wt   rt 1b0t 1 + b0t; (7)
rtb
0
t  0; (8)
where wt and b0t are the wage rate and the borrowing of the worker at date t.
There is a competitive nal goods market. Production function of a
representative rm is
Yt = AK
0;
t N
1 
t
k1 t ; (9)
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where A is productivity, and Yt is output of the representative rm at date t:7
K 0t and Nt are capital and labor inputs of the rm at date t. kt is per-labor
capital of this economy at date t, capturing the positive externality in the
sense of Romer (1986).8
Each rm chooses capital and labor inputs to maximize its prot, given
the relative price of capital to consumption goods, qt, the wage rate, wt, and
the externality, kt. Considering the equilibrium of k0t = kt; we obtain yt =
Ak0t; where k
0
t; and yt are per-labor capital and output of the rm. Because
the workers population is one, the aggregate capital input and output equal
per-labor capital and output. Competitive factor prices produce
qt = A; wt = A(1  )k0t: (10)
Let us denote aggregate consumption of H-entrepreneurs, L-entrepreneurs,
and workers at date t as CHt ; C
L
t ; and C
0
t. Similarly, let Z
H
t ; Z
L
t ; B
H
t ; B
L
t ; and
B0t be aggregate investment, and the amount of borrowing of each type. Then,
the market clearing for goods, credit, and capital are
CHt + C
L
t + C
0
t + Z
H
t + Z
L
t = Yt; (11)
BHt +B
L
t +B
0
t = 0; (12)
k0t = Kt; (13)
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock produced by the entrepreneurs at
date t.
2.1 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is dened as a set of prices frt; qt; wtg1t=0 and
quantities

ct; c
0
t; bt; b
0
t; zt; C
H
t ; C
L
t ; C
0
t; B
H
t ; B
L
t ; B
0
t; Z
H
t ; Z
L
t ; K
0
t; Kt; Yt
	1
t=0
which
satises the conditions that (i) each entrepreneur and worker maximizes util-
7Here, we suppose that each rm is operated by workers. Since the net prot of each
rm is zero in equilibrium, the ow of funds constraint of the workers does not change,
and is the same as (7).
8The reason we use an endogenous growth model is that we want to analyze not only
how nancial development a¤ects long-run growth, but also growth volatility through
nancial amplication. See Aghion et al (1999, 2007) for similar analyses.
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ity, and each rm maximizes its prot, and (ii) the market for goods, la-
bor, credit, and capital all clear. Because there is no shock except for the
idiosyncratic shocks to the state of the entrepreneurs, there is no aggregate
uncertainty, and the agents have perfect foresight about future prices and
aggregate quantities in the equilibrium.
We are now in a position to characterize equilibrium behavior of entre-
preneurs. Let us consider the case where  is lower than 1 (1 is dened
later in Proposition 1. We use a method of guess-and verify here.). If  is
lower than 1, in the neighborhood of the steady state, the real interest rate
equals the rate of return on low prot investment (This can be veried in
Proposition 1.). That is, we have
rt = q
L: (14)
And so, H-entrepreneurs prefer high prot investment with maximum
leverage. The borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs binds because the
rate of return on their investment is greater than the real interest rate. Since
the utility function is log, they consume a fraction (1  ) of the net worth,
ct = (1   )(qkt   rt 1bt 1). Then, by using (4), and (5), the investment
function of H-entrepreneurs becomes
zt =
(qkt   rt 1bt 1)
1  q
H
rt
: (15)
The numerator of (15) is the required down payment for unit investment.
From (15), we see that the investment equals the leverage, 1=

1  (qH=rt)

times savings, (qkt   rt 1bt 1). The leverage is greater than one, and in-
creases with : This implies that when  is large, H-entrepreneurs can nance
more investment with smaller net worth. We also see that the sensitivity of
investment response to a change in the net worth becomes higher with .
This implies that even a small decline (increase) in the net worth can have a
large negative (positive) e¤ect on the investment.
Concerning workers, in the neighborhood of the steady state, the borrow-
ing constraint binds (This can be veried later in footnote 9.). Thus, they
consume all the income at every date, c0t = wt: From this behavior of workers,
credit market equilibrium, (12) becomes
BHt +B
L
t = 0: (16)
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To L-entrepreneurs, they are indi¤erent between lending and investing
by themselves because the real interest rate is the same as the return on
their investment. Their saving rate is also a fraction  of their net worth.
Then, the aggregate lending and investment of them are determined by goods
market clearing condition, (11).
Since consumption, debt and investment are linear functions of the net
worth, we can aggregate across agents to nd the law of motion of the ag-
gregate capital:
Kt+1 = K
H
t+1 +K
L
t+1 = 
H E
H
t
1  q
H
rt
+ L
0BB@Yt   EHt
1  q
H
rt
1CCA
=

1 +

H   L
L   H

st

ALKt; (17)
whereKHt+1 andK
L
t+1 are the aggregate capital stock produced by H-entrepreneurs
and L-entrepreneurs at date t+1, respectively. EHt is the aggregate net worth
of H-entrepreneurs, and st  EHt =Yt is their net worth share against the ag-
gregate net worth of all entrepreneurs. Since Yt = AKt holds in equilibrium,
and from (17), economic growth rate becomes
gt+1  Yt+1
Yt
=

1 +

H   L
L   H

st

AL: (18)
From (18), once st is determined, economic growth rate is also determined.
(18) implies that economic growth rate increases with nancial development.
Intuitively, when nancial development improves, the borrowing constraint
of H-entrepreneurs becomes relaxed. In the credit market, more credit can
be allocated to high prot investment projects, which promotes capital accu-
mulation, and eventually economic growth. As in a traditional endogenous
growth setting, capital accumulation is the engine of economic growth.
The movement of the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs evolves
according to
EHt = p(qtK
H
t   rt 1BHt 1) +X(1  p)(qtKLt   rt 1BLt 1): (19)
The rst term of (19) represents the aggregate net worth of the entrepre-
10
neurs who continue to have high prot investment from the previous period.
The second term represents the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs
who switch from the state of having only low prot investment to the state
of having high prot investment. By using (18) and (19), we can derive the
law of motion of the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs:
st+1 =
p
H(1  )
L   H st +X(1  p)(1  st)
1 +
H   L
L   H st
 (st; ): (20)
The dynamic evolution of the economy is characterized by the recursive
equilibrium: (wt; Kt+1; Yt+1; gt+1; st+1; ) that satises (10), (13), (17), (18),
and (20) as functions of the state variables (Kt; Yt; st):
2.2 Steady State Equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium of this economy depends upon the degree of -
nancial development. That is, we have the following proposition (See Figure
1.1 and 1.2. Proof is in Appendix 1).
Proposition 1 There are three stages of nancial development, correspond-
ing to three di¤erent values of . The characteristics of each region are as
follows:
(a) Region 1: 0   < 1  (1   p)=

H=L   p+X(1  p) : Since
the real interest rate equals the rate of return on low prot investment, the
borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs binds. Both H-and L-entrepreneurs
produce capital. The steady state values of g; s; and r satisfy
g =

1 +

H   L
L   H

s

AL; s = (s; ); r = AL: (21)
(b) Region 2: 1   < 2  1=(1 +X): Since the real interest rate takes
the value of r 2 AL; AH, the borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs
binds, and they produce capital. However, L-entrepreneurs do not produce
capital because the real interest rate is greater than the rate of return on their
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investment. The steady state values satisfy
g = AH ; s = p(1  ) +X(1  p); r = A
H
(1  p)= + p X(1  p) :
(22)
(c) Region 3: 2    1: Since the real interest equals the rate of return
on high prot investment, the borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs does
not bind. Only H-entrepreneurs produce capital. The steady state values
satisfy
g = AH ; s =
X
1 +X
; r = AH : (23)
In region 1 where nancial development is relatively low, the nancial
system can not transfer enough savings to high prot investment because of
agency problems. In the credit markets, some of the savings ow to low prot
investment because they are not subject to agency frictions. In this region, as
nancial development improves, more credit is allocated to high prot invest-
ment. This improvement of credit allocation promotes capital accumulation,
the wage rate, and economic growth (See Figure 1.1). However, in this region
the real interest rate is unchanged. This property is similar to Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) model. In their model, when information asymmetry is large,
the real interest rate is insensitive, and becomes constant where the banks
prot is maximized. Similarly, in our model, when nancial development is
low, the real interest rate is sticky (See Figure 1.2).
In region 2 where nancial development is high, but not so high, the
situation changes. As nancial markets develop, the real interest rate starts
rising because of the tightness in the credit market, and all the savings are
allocated to high prot investment, even though the borrowing constraint still
binds for H-entrepreneurs. In this region, since only H-entrepreneurs produce
capital, the growth rate of the economy becomes constant, and independent
of . This implies that once the nancial system is developed to some degree,
it can transfer enough purchasing power to the entrepreneurs who have high
prot investment from the entrepreneurs who have only low prot investment.
In addition, in region 1 and 2, since the interest rate is lower than the rate
of return on H-entrepreneurs investment, income distribution is di¤erent
between H-and L-entrepreneurs.
When nancial markets grow further, and reaches region 3, the real in-
terest rate becomes equal to the rate of return on high prot investment.
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Therefore, the borrowing constraint for H-entrepreneurs no longer binds. As
in region 2, the nancial system can allocate all the savings to only high
prot investment. Moreover, since H-and L-entrepreneurs earn the same
rate of return, there is no di¤erence in income distribution.910
2.3 Dynamics
Now, let us look at how this economy responds to an unexpected shock
to productivity. Suppose that at date    1 the economy is in region 1,
and in the steady state: g 1 = g; s 1 = s and r 1 = r. There is
then an unexpected shock to productivity at date  : A declines by "; and
becomes A = A(1  "): However, the shock is known to be temporary. The
productivity at date +1 and thereafter returns to A: Here since we consider
a negative shock, we set " to be positive.
Following Kocherlakota (2000), we measure nancial amplication (volatil-
ity) of a downward shock " to be how far economic growth rate from  to
 + 1 jumps down from the steady-state growth rate through the borrowing
constraint. Considering q = A(1   ") and A = A(1   "); from (18) and
(19), we obtain
Amplication  dg+1
d"
j"=0 =

H   L
L   H

ds
d"
j"=0| {z }
	
AL < 0: (24)
Since H-entrepreneurs have a net debt in the aggregate, and debts repay-
ment does not change by this shock, the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs
decreases at date  , ds
d"
< 0 (See Appendix 2). Because the adjustment of the
real interest rate does not work well in region 1, their borrowing constraint
9In our model, in the neighborhood of the steady state equilibrium, the borrowing
constraint of the workers binds in all three regions because 0rt=gt+1 < 1 holds. This can
be veried by embedding (21), (22), and (23) into the inequality. Of course, considering a
model where workers also choose to lend may be an interesting extention.
10The di¤erence between Kiyotaki(1998)s paper and ours is that although his paper
does not explicitly mention it, Kiyotakis analysis implicitly assumes a certain low ;
which is within region 1 in this paper, and then, keeping the  xed, he examines how
amplication occurs. On the other hand, our paper analyzes whether or not the magnitude
of amplication by itself increases or decreases together with  not only in low  region,
but also high  region.
13
becomes tightened. As a result, the investment function of H-entrepreneurs
is shifted to the left as in Figure 2, and they are forced to cut back on their
investment from ZH0;0 to Z
H0;1
 : (In Figure 2, Z
H0 represents the aggregate
investment curve of H-entrepreneurs as a share against the aggregate sav-
ings, and SV represents the aggregate saving curve as a share against the
aggregate savings.) Moreover, these balance sheet e¤ects cause more credit
to ow to the investment without agency frictions. What is called ight to
qualityoccurs. Through these e¤ects, less capital is produced at date  +1,
so that economic growth rate at date +1 jumps down from the steady state
growth rate.
2.4 Financial Development and the Magnitude of Am-
plication
Now, we are in a position to examine whether nancial development accel-
erates or dampens these nancial amplication e¤ects.
First, lets check region 1. By di¤erentiating (24) with respect to ; we
obtain
@2g+1
@@"
j"=0 = @
@

H   L
L   H

| {z }

@s
@"
j"=0| {z }
	
AL+

H   L
L   H

@2s
@@"
j"=0| {z }
	
AL < 0:
(25)
The rst term represents the sensitivity of the H-entrepreneursinvest-
ment response to a change in the net worth share. Since it becomes higher
with , with even a small decline in the net worth share, H-entrepreneurs are
forced to reduce their investment substantially. The second term represents
the degree of a decline in the net worth share. It says that the decline by
itself becomes larger with  (See Appendix 2). This implies that when 
is high, the leverage and debt/asset ratios of H-entrepreneurs also rise. In
such a situation, even a small negative productivity shock can cause a large
decline in the net worth share. Taken together, H-entrepreneurs have to make
deeper cuts in their investment. Moreover, this causes a substantial credit
shift from the investment with agency frictions to the one without agency
frictions. That is, balance sheet e¤ects and ight to quality are signicant.
Hence, in region 1, nancial development accelerates nancial amplication
e¤ects, thereby leading to increased macroeconomic volatility.
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Once the economy enters region 2, the situation changes dramatically.
The adjustment of the real interest rate starts operating. As a result, nancial
amplication is dampened. In order to clarify this point, lets look at the
equilibrium of the credit market in region 2 at date  :
s
1  q+1
H
r
= 1: (26)
The left hand side and the right hand side of (26) are the investment
function and the saving function, respectively. From (26), the real interest
rate is determined once s is given. Remember that since the productivity
shock is temporary, the relative price of capital to consumption goods at date
 + 1 becomes q+1 = A.
Next, lets look at how the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs changes by
this shock. The aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs and the aggregate
output at date  follow
EH = p

A(1  ")KH   r 1BH 1

) +X(1  p)r 1BH 1; (27)
Y = A(1  ")HY 1: (28)
From (27) and (28), the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs at date  follows
s =
p(1     ") +X(1  p)
1  " : (29)
And so, by using (26) and (29), we obtain an expression for the equilib-
rium interest rate at date  :
r =
AH(1  ")
(1  p)(1  ") + [p X(1  p)]  : (30)
From (30), we observe that the real interest rate declines at the time of
the shock. Intuitively, following the shock, the borrowing constraint becomes
tightened as in region 1. And then, the investment function is shifted to the
left. However, in region 2, together with this shift, the real interest rate goes
down in the credit market as in Figure 3. This decline in the real interest rate
in turn relaxes the borrowing constraint, thereby weakening the balance sheet
e¤ects and preventing ight to quality. As a result, nancial amplication
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is dampened. This implies that once nancial development passes a certain
degree, the adjustment of the real interest rate recovers, so that even if the
economy is hit by the shock, all the credit ow only to high prot investment.
Therefore, the shock does not get amplied. Financial development leads to
macroeconomic stability.11
When nancial development reaches region 3, even the shock hits the
economy, the nancial system can transfer enough purchasing power to those
who have high productive investment from those who have only low prot
investment without the adjustment of the real interest rate (See Figure 4).
The real interest rate at date  , AH and the growth rate from  to  + 1,
AH are unchanged. So, no nancial amplication occurs. The following
proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 The relationship between nancial development and nan-
cial amplication is non-monotonic: nancial amplication initially increases
with nancial development (in region 1) and later falls down (in region 2 and
3).
This non-monotonicity is consistent with empirical studies. For example,
Easterly et al. (2000) demonstrate that the relationship between nancial
development and growth volatility is non-monotonic. They show that while
developed nancial systems o¤er oppurtunities for stabilization, they may
also imply higher leverage of rms and thus more risks and less stability. A
recent study by Kunieda (2008) also show empirically that the relationship
is hump-shaped, i.e., in early stages of nancial development, as the nancial
sector develops in an economy, it becomes highly volatile. However, as the
nancial sector matures further, the volatility starts to reduce once again.
Based on the above analysis, we might be able to explain why we observe
two conicting views. The traditional view might discuss region 2 or 3 where
nancial markets are well developed. Indeed, in Arrow-Debreu economy
where there are no agency frictions in credit markets,  is equal to one,
which is within region 3 in this paper. On the other hand, the new view
might discuss region 1 where nancial development is not so high, and there
are agency frictions to some degree in nancial markets (See Figure 5). In
11Indeed, the growth rate of the economy from date  to  + 1 can be written as
g = A
Hs=(1  q+1H=r ): By embedding (26) into this, we obtain g = AH;
which implies that the growth rate from at date  to  + 1 is unchagend.
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this sense, the discrepancy between two views might arise from the di¤erence
in the degree of nancial development.12
The implications of Proposition 1 and 2 are that in region 1, nancial
development produces more capital, promotes economic growth, and leads
to higher wage rate. Therefore, it improves welfare of all agents13. However,
once negative productivity shocks hit the economy, since the economy is
highly leveraged, downward amplication is signicant. In this sense, there
is a trade-o¤ between higher economic growth and macroeconomic stability.
But, once nancial development reaches region 2 or 3, both go together.
Moreover, from Proposition 2, our model may also have implications for
asymmetric movements of business uctuations. As Kocherlakota (2000) em-
phasizes, macroeconomics looks for an asymmetric amplication and propa-
gation mechanism that can turn small shocks to the economy into the busi-
ness cycle uctuations. Our model might deliver this. For example, if the
economy is around 2; to positive productivity shocks, even though the bor-
rowing constraint for H-entrepreneurs is binding, the economy will not re-
spond upwardly because the interest rate will go up in the credit market.
On the other hand, to negative productivity shocks, it will react downwardly
because the interest rate does not adjust.14 We summarize this result in
Proposition 3.
12You may wonder why large downward amplication occurs repeatedly in the real
economy where nancial development keeps increasing over time, even though our model
suggests that nancial amplication eventually becomes small in high  region. Here is
one interpretation from this model. In this model, the important factor which a¤ects the
size of nancial amplication is H ; which is put on high protable investment, not on
low protable investment. Considering this point, think about the case where the existing
projects with L disappper, and new investment opportunities with higher protability
than the existing H come into the economy. In such a situation, the  which is put on
those new investment projects matters. If the  is low, the economy will get into region 1
again even if it was in region 2 or 3 before. In the real economy, this process might repeats
itself.
13To the entrepreneurs and the workers, since the net returns from high protable invest-
ment, H(1  )=(1  H=L) and the wage rate are higher in more developed nancial
system, the level of their expected consumption is also higher, and so is welfare.
14Here we consider small shocks. However, if we think about relatively large productivity
shocks, business uctuations may become asymmetric, even if the economy is far from 2.
In the case with relatively large positive shocks, positive propagation occurs, but the
degree of it is weakened because the adjustment of the interest rate works. However, to
the negative shocks, because the adjustment does not work, the economy experiences large
downward propagation.
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Proposition 3 If the level of nancial development is around 2; business
uctuations are asymmetric.
3 Policy Analysis
As we analyzed in the previous section, we learn that in region 1, once neg-
ative productivity shocks hit the economy, donward amplication occurs,
which causes capital accumulation and economic growth rate to drop down.
From a welfare point of view, this impairs the workerswelfare because the
wage rate declines. A natural question is can a government mitigate the drop
in the economic growth rate and the workerswelfare? In this section, as a
stabilization policy, we examine the role of monetary policy, and discuss its
welfare implications.15 In order to do so, we extend the model of the previous
section, and get money into it.
In the monetary economy, the ow of funds constraints for the entrepre-
neurs and the workers, (5) and (7) can be rewritten as follows
for entrepreneurs,
mt
Pt
+ ct = qtkt  
Pt 1
Pt
it 1bt 1 + bt +
mt 1
Pt
; (31)
for workers,
m0t
Pt
+ c0t = wt  
Pt 1
Pt
it 1b0t 1 + b
0
t +
m0t 1
Pt
; (32)
wheremt andm
0
t are the nominal money demand of the entrepreneurs and the
workers, respectively. Pt is the price level at date t; and it 1 is gross nominal
interest rate at date t   1. We assume that debt contracts are nominal.16
Then, the borrowing constraints become
for entrepreneurs,
Pt
P et+1
itbt  qt+1izt; for workers,
Pt
P et+1
itb
0
t  0; (33)
where P et+1 is the price level at date t+ 1 expected at date t.
In the monetary economy, all agents face cash-in-advance (CIA) con-
straint following Lucas and Stocky (1984):
15Aghion et al. (1999) analyzes scal policies.
16Iacoviello (2005) points out that in almost all the low ination countries, debt contracts
are nominal.
18
for entrepreneurs, mt 1  Ptct; for workers, m0t 1  Ptc0t: (34)
Each entrepreneur and worker holds money to consume. We consider the
equilibria where CIA constraint for both agents binds.
The competitive equilibrium is dened as a set of prices fit; wt; qt; Ptg1t=0
and quantities

ct; c
0
t; bt; b
0
t; zt;mt;m
0
t; C
H
t ; C
L
t ; C
0
t; B
H
t ; B
L
t ; B
0
t; Z
H
t ; Z
L
t ; K
0
t; Kt; Yt
	1
t=0
which satises the conditions that (i) each entrepreneur maximizes (1) sub-
ject to (31), (33), and (34), and each worker maximizes (6) subject to (32),
(33), and (34), and each rm maximizes its prot, given the relative price of
capital to consumption goods, the wage rate, and the externality. (ii) The
markets for goods, labor, capital, credit, and money all clear. Since there is
no aggregate uncertainty, all agents have perfect foresight about future prices
and quantities in equilibrium. That is, P et+1 = Pt+1 hold:
Since we focus on binding CIA constraint, and the utility function is log,
then we have mt = Pt(1  )(qtkt   rt 1bt 1), and m0t = Ptwt. That is, each
entrepreneur uses a fraction (1   ) of the net worth to buy money. Each
worker uses all income to buy money. When we aggregate across all agents,
we obtain the aggregate money demand at date t, MDt :
MDt = Pt(1  )Yt: (35)
(35) implies that when aggregate output declines, the aggregate demand
for money also decreases.
Government budget constraint is
PtGt =Mt  Mt 1: (36)
where Gt andMt are the government (consolidated government) expenditure
and the money supply at date t, respectively. The government nances ex-
penditure by printing money. We assume that the government expenditure
does not a¤ect utility of the agents.
Monetary policy rule is
Mt = Mt 1; (37)
where  is gross money growth rate. The monetary authority keeps the
money growth rate constant.
Money market clearing condition is
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Mt =M
D
t : (38)
The dynamic evolution of the economy is characterized by the recursive
equilibrium: (wt; Kt+1; Yt+1; gt+1; st+1; Gt) that satises (10), (13), (17), (18),
(20), (35), (36), and (38) as functions of the state variables, (Kt; Yt; st) and
monetary policy rule, (37):
In order to understand the dynamics in the monetary economy, we con-
sider the same experiment as in section 2. At date  , under a xed ; there
is an unexpected negative shock to productivity by ". Following the shock,
if other things were kept constant, the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs
would decrease. Then, the investment function would be shifted to the left
through the balance sheet e¤ects, which would cause ight to quality (See
Figure 7). However, in the monetary economy, this does not happen in equi-
librium. There is an additional feedback e¤ect to the credit market, which
is not generated in the nonmonetary economy.
In order to make this point clear, lets look at the money market equilib-
rium at date  :
M = P (1  )(1  ")Y e ; (39)
where Y e is the aggregate output at date  expected at date    1: Given
the negative shock of size ", the aggregate output declines by ": Together
with this decline, since the net worth of all entrepreneurs and the wage rate
of the workers decrease, the aggregate money demand (the right hand side
of (39)) also falls down. Then, from (39), if monetary authority keeps the
money growth rate constant, for the money market to clear, the price level
goes up. This rise in the price level in turn reduces the real burden of
debts repayment for borrowers (H-entrepreneurs at date    1) by ", which
produces a shift-back e¤ect as in Figure 6. Consequently, in equilibrium,
the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs at date  ; s is unchanged, which
implies that the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs and the aggregate
net worth of all entrepreneurs fall in the same proportion. As a result, no
nancial amplication occurs as if the economy were in region 2 or 3. We
summarize this in Proposition 4.17
17Nominal contracts also play an important role to produce shock cushioning e¤ects.
If the contracts are index, the e¤ects are not generated. This point is di¤erent from the
existing view that nominal contracts magnify the shocks. Iacoviello (2005) also derives
simillar results with simulation by extending the model with price stickiness while our
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Proposition 4 Suppose that debt contracts are nominal, and the economy is
in region 1 of the monetary economy. In the case of an unexpected productiv-
ity shock, the money growth targeting policy dampens nancial amplication
by generating the shock cushioning e¤ects.
Proof: By using the money market clearing condition, the aggregate real
debts repayment at date  can be rewritten as follows: i 1B 1P 1=P =
(1   ")i 1B 1P 1=P e ; where P e is the price level at date  expected at
date    1: By putting this into (19), and then solving s ; we see that the
net worth share at date  remain unchanged.
On the other hand, if monetary authority adopts ination targeting pol-
icy, the shock is exacerbated through the balance sheet e¤ects and ight to
quality. This is because, under ination targeting policy, since the monetary
authority tries to keep the ination rate of each period the same as the one in
the steady state, it decreases the money growth rate accommodatively with
the decline in the aggregate money demand. As a result, since the real bur-
den of debts repayment is unchanged, the shock cushioning e¤ects and the
shift-back e¤ect are not generated. We summarize this result in Proposition
5.
Proposition 5 Suppose that debt contracts are nominal, and the economy is
in region 1 of the monetary economy. If monetary authority adopts ination
targeting policy in the case of an unexpected productivity shock, the shock
cushioning e¤ects are not generated, so that nancial amplication occurs.
Proof: Since P is equal to P e ; the real burden of the aggregate debts
is unchanged. Considering this point, if we embed q = A(1   ") and
A = A(1  ") into (18) and (19), we have dsd" < 0:
3.1 Discussion: Welfare Implications
From the previous section, although we learn that the money growth target-
ing policy stabilizes the economy by weakening nancial amplication, does
this policy improve agentswelfare compared to ination targeting policy?
In this section, we discuss this point.
Lets compare welfare of each agent. Let V MGt ; V
IT
t ; V
0MG
t ; V
0IT
t be welfare
of an entrepreneur and a worker under the money growth targeting (MG) and
model is based on exible price settings, and derives the results analytically.
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ination targeting (IT) policies, respectively. Similarly, let ci;MGt ; c
0;MG
t ; c
i;IT
t ;
c0;ITt ; w
MG
t ; w
IT
t ; e
i;MG
t ; e
i;IT
t ; and 
MG
t ; 
IT
t be consumption of the entrepre-
neurs and workers, the wage rate, the net worth of the entrepreneurs, and
the ination rate at date t, where t  Pt 1=Pt:
For the worker, the welfare becomes
V 0MG = E
" 1X
n=0
n log c0;MG+n
#
= E
" 1X
n=0
n log

wMG+n 1
MG+n
#
; (40)
V 0IT = E
" 1X
n=0
n log c0;IT+n
#
= E
" 1X
n=0
n log

wIT+n 1
IT+n
#
: (41)
The welfare depends upon the ination rate and the wage rate at date 
and thereafter. By subtracting (40) from (41), we obtain
V 0MG   V 0IT = log

IT
MG

| {z }
	
+ E
26664
1X
n=1
n+1 log

wMG+n
wIT+n

| {z }

37775 : (42)
From (42), we can understand whether or not the MG policy improves
welfare of the worker compared to the IT policy. The rst term of (42) rep-
resents the di¤erence in the ination rate at date  under the two policies.
Under the MG policy, following the shock, the higher ination occurs unex-
pectedly at date  . That is, we have MG > 
IT
 . This reduces the purchasing
power of money, so that the workers consumption at date  decreases. Thus,
the rst term is negative. Note that the ination rate after  +1 is the same
under the two policies.18
The second term represents the di¤erence in the wage rate. Under the
MG policy, because of the unexpected higher ination, the redistribution
of wealth occurs at date  from L-entrepreneurs at date    1, who are
lenders, to H-entrepreneurs at date    1, who are borrowers (note that
p > X(1  p)). This increases the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs at
date  : Consequently, the borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs at date 
18Under the MG policy, since no nancial amplication occurs, the ination rate after
date  + 1 equals to the one in the steady state.
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becomes relaxed, so that more capital is going to be produced at date  + 1
and thereafter, which pushes up the wage rate after date  +1, wMG+n > w
IT
+n
(n  1). Thus, the second term is positive. Note that the wage rate at date
 is the same, wMG = w
IT
 : Hence, whether or not the MG policy improves
the workers welfare compared to the IT policy depends upon the above two
e¤ects. If A is high or  is low, there is a large positive spillover e¤ect on the
wage rate. Then, the positive e¤ect might become larger than the negative
e¤ect.
Similarly, for the entrepreneur, we obtain
V MG   V IT = log

IT
MG

| {z }
	
+ E0
266666666664
1X
n=0
n+1 log
 
ei;MG+n
ei;IT+n
!
| {z }
 for H-entrepreneurs at date    1:
	 for L-entrepreneurs at date    1:
377777777775
:
(43)
The rst term is the same as the worker. The second term represents the
di¤erence in the net worth under the two policies. Under the MG policy,
for the entrepreneurs who had high productive investment at date    1;
who are borrowers, they gain at date  ; eH;MG > e
H;IT
 because the real bur-
den of debts repayment is reduced. Therefore, their net worth after  + 1
will also increase, eH;MG+n > e
H;IT
+n (n  1). For them, if the positive ef-
fect becomes larger than the negative e¤ect (the rst term), their welfare
improves under the MG policy. On the other hand, for the entrepreneurs
who had low productive investment at date    1; who are lenders, they lose
at date  ; eL;MG < e
L;IT
 : Therefore, their net worth after  + 1 will also
decrease, eL;MG+n < e
L;IT
+n (n  1). For them, the MG policy impairs their
welfare. Hence, since our model has heterogeneity among agents, the welfare
impacts of a particular monetary policy rule are also heterogeneous between
the agents.1920
19Woodford (2003) discusses optimal monetary policy with a single agent model.
20In stead of monetary policy, we can think of a tax cut policy. For example, suppose
that the government imposes tax on the entrepreneurs net worth. Imagine that the
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate theoretically how nancial development a¤ects
the magnitude of nancial amplication. Extending a model with borrowing
constraints and heterogeneous investment projects, we show that the e¤ect of
nancial development on nancial amplication is non-monotonic: nancial
amplication initially increases with nancial development and later falls
down.
Moreover, we study the role of monetary policy to reduce nancial ampli-
cation. We nd that in the case of unexpected productivity shocks, money
growth targeting policy dampens nancial amplication by generating shock
cushioning e¤ects, thereby stabilizing economies. On the other hand, ina-
tion targeting exacerbates the shocks because under the policy, shock cush-
ioning e¤ects are not generated, thereby destabilizing economies.
As future research, the next step would be that we want to develop quan-
titative assessment into the relationship between the development of nancial
markets and volatility of the economy. Another step would be to consider
the welfare cost of volatility in a heterogeneous agents model with aggregate
uncertainty. These directions will be promising.
economy experiences an unexpected negative productivity shock at date  as in section
2. Under laisser-fair economy, since the net worth of all entrepreneurs at date  decreases
by this shock, downward amplication occurs. However, if the government conducts a tax
cut policy at date  (at the same time of the shock), then the entrepreneursnet worth
increases at date  . As a result, downward amplication is dampened. The economy is
insulated from the negative shock. Moreover, this policy improves all the entrepreneurs
welfare because their consumption increases at date  and thereafter.
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Appendix 1
In order to verify that (14) holds in equilibrium, we only need to check
that the entrepreneurs with low prot investment invest positive amounts of
goods:
ZLt = Yt
0BB@1  st
1  
H
L
1CCA : (44)
Using (20), we nd that (44) becomes positive in the neighborhood of the
steady state if, and only if  is lower than 1:
Moreover, from (22); if  < 1=(1+X); then r < AH : That is, the real
interest rate is lower than the marginal productivity of the entrepreneurs with
high prot investment. Thus, the borrowing constraint for H-entrepreneurs
binds. For L-entrepreneurs, since the real interest rate is greater than the
rate of return on their investment, they would prefer lending to investing by
themselves.
We also see that if  = 1=(1+X); then r = AH : Thus, the borrowing
constraint for H-entrepreneurs no longer binds. Furthermore, If  is greater
than 1=(1 + X); then for the credit market to clear, the real interest rate
has to equal AH (If the real interest rate is greater than AH ; nobody is
willing to borrow in the credit markets. This can not be an equilibrium.).
Appendix 2
By embedding q = A(1  ") and A = A(1  ") into (18) and (19), and
di¤erentiating s with respect to ", we obtain
@s
@
j"=0 = [p X(1  p)]  
Hs
L   H + (H L)s < 0: (45)
And then, by using (45), we have
@2s
@@
j"=0 = [p X(1  p)]H
 @s

@
(L   H)  Ls   (H   L)s2
[L   H + (H   L)s]2 < 0:
(46)
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